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ABSTRACT
An issue commonly identiﬁed with the vast and costly developments that cities
produce to host the Olympic Games is that they are prone to becoming ‘white
elephants’ – obsolete or underused constructions that become cost burdens for
cities. White elephants are particularly associated with some of the most recent
Games of the twenty-ﬁrst century, as reﬂected in accounts of ‘limping’ or
obsolete venues in Sydney, Athens, Beijing, Rio and Sochi. This paper begins
with a review of issues associated with spatial planning, architecture and
planning process in the production of white elephants in Olympic history. It
goes on to provide an historical account of London’s eﬀorts from 2002 to
2012 avoid attracting a repetition of the critique that followed earlier
Olympics. Finally, it assesses its ongoing eﬀorts and record over the six-year






An issue commonly identiﬁed with the vast and costly developments that cities produce to host the
Olympic Games is that they are prone to becoming “white elephants.” ‘White elephants’ are particu-
larly associated with the cities that have hosted some of the most recent Games of the twenty-ﬁrst
century, as reﬂected in accounts of the ‘uncertain legacy’ of Sydney’s Stadium two years after the
2000 Games, Athens’s struggles to generate viable reuses for its venues, Beijing’s largely empty
‘bird’s nest’ stadium, and of numerous hoarded or boarded-up venues in Rio, Sochi and beyond.1
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the origins of the term ‘white elephant’ lie within the
seventeenth century accounts of European travellers to South East Asia.2 The term describes Asian
elephants exhibiting a rare form of skin pigmentation resulting in ‘pale skin, hair, nails, and eyes’.3
These animals were venerated within Siamese and Burmese culture. To keep one was to hold a sym-
bol of wealth and eminence and, as such, a prized possession. However, they had no real practical
value, meaning that, in economic terms, they were a cost burden to their owners. On occasion,
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the Kings of Siam are alleged to have oﬀered them as gifts to courtiers who had displeased them,
seeming to enhance their status while actually ruining them through the cost of their maintenance.
These accounts have long been called into question as historical facts but, as the OED suggests,
they underpin a second, newer deﬁnition in which the term can denote any ‘burdensome or costly
objective, enterprise, or possession, esp. one that appears magniﬁcent; a ﬁnancial liability’. This
includes products of planning and architectural design that bear these characteristics, such as devel-
opments for the Olympic Games and other megaevents.
These developments, which often involve large infrastructure projects as well as vast parklands
and architecturally iconic venues, often hold huge symbolic value for host cities at the time that
bids for the Games are won and when they are opened and televised as spectacle around the
world. They are seen to become white elephants typically through failures to manage the high
and often spiraling costs associated with their construction, to secure long term “practical value,”
leading to untimely, unplanned obsolescence, and to cover long-term maintenance costs with the
revenues associated with any post-Games reuses. As for the Siamese courtier, the initial elevation
of a city’s status through a winning bid can be undermined by the impacts of costs on public ﬁnances,
by the limited beneﬁts developments create for citizens, and by the physical appearance of ‘limping’4
or even crumbling structures. Planning and design (at the urban and architectural scale) have a key
role to play in producing or avoiding the production of gaps between intentions or expectations and
impacts or legacies.5
From the time of the bid for the 2012 Games in 2002-2004, leaders and promoters of London’s
Games made avoiding white elephants, already becoming a focus of the scholarly critique of the lega-
cies of Sydney 2000, a key pledge. TheMayor of London Ken Livingstone is reported to have stated at
a Press Conference in Athens in 2004 that:
[i]t would be utterly inexcusable if, were we to win the games, the facilities we build were to end up
unused. They have to be available to the people of the city and of the deprived areas these games are
intended to regenerate.6
Upon the award of the 2012 Games to London in 2005, he vowed that the reusability and regenera-
tive potential of the Olympic stage set would be key components in London’s quest to deliver the
‘most sustainable Games ever’.7
This paper provides an historical account of London’s eﬀorts through planning and design from
2002 to avoid white elephants, focussing on its sports venues and especially those set within the Olym-
pic Park in East London. It begins with a review of literature to understand the key aspects of planning
and design that have been associated with the production of white elephant venues in other Olympic
cities. It goes on to explore London’s approach in terms of these aspects and any other distinctive strat-
egies to avoid white elephants in the run-up to the Games (2002-2012). The ﬁnal section explores the
outcomes of the approach in terms of the process of transforming the main Olympic Park after 2012,
the reuses of its ﬁve permanent venues (2012-2018) and the management of costs related to venue
adaptation, operation and maintenance. The paper concludes by arguing that London’s record in
terms of the production of white elephants is mixed and by setting out how it advances existing under-
standings of how white elephant venues are either created or avoided.
4Mangan, “Prologue: Guarantees of Global Goodwill: Post-Olympic Legacies,” 1869–83.
5For example: Brown and Cresciani, “Adaptable Design in Olympic Construction,” 397–416; Smith, Events and Urban Regeneration; Stewart
and Rayner, “Planning Mega-event Legacies,” 157–79.
6Kelso, “Heavyweights Line up for London’s 2012 Bid.”
7Ibid.
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White Elephants in Olympic Planning and Design History
The production of white elephants reﬂects the ‘paradox’ that Flybvjerg et al have associated with
megaprojects more broadly: cities have continued to justify vast expenditures on the production
of venues and parklands on the basis of future beneﬁts while obsolescence, cost overruns and lasting
issues of economic viability have also continued to raise signiﬁcant questions about the value of these
investments for cities.8
History shows that white elephants have been produced since some of the earliest instances of the
Modern Games. The ﬁrst documented case is main stadium produced for the 1908 London Olympics
which was little used between the Games and its eventual demolition in 1962.9 Other commonly
cited examples include the venues constructed for Montreal 1976 and Sarajevo 1984. However,
the most signiﬁcant body of analysis relates to the legacies of Summer and Winter Games held in
the twenty-ﬁrst century including the Summer Olympics of Sydney 2000, Athens 2004 and Beijing
2008 and the Winter Olympics of Turin 2010.
The fate of venues can be shaped by factors that lie outside the direct scope of planning and
design. In Bosnia, for example, the decayed leftovers of the Sarajevo 1984 Winter Games, and the
eventual reuse of one venue as a graveyard in the aftermath of the 1990s Balkan Wars testiﬁes to
the crucial role of broader social and political contexts. Notwithstanding, decisions related to plan-
ning and design are recognized as signiﬁcant in the production of gaps between expectations of
future beneﬁts and the ‘hard realities’ of materializing legacy.10
Starting at the urban to regional scale, the location of venues relative to urban cores and/or
planned development has been shown to have an important bearing on their reuse potentials.11
The choice to locate the Olympics in peripheral areas is often done on the basis that this can con-
centrate the beneﬁts of investment on these places, helping to ‘catalyse’ planned regeneration and/or
the development of new urban quarters.12 This is understood as an intention or promise commonly
associated with of megaevents in the context of neoliberal urban planning policies.13 But, in instances
where the Games have been located in spatially peripheral sites, such as Sydney’s Paramatta, venue
reuses have been seen to be aﬀected by the absence of existing local communities creating footfall and
demand.14 The venues of more centralized Games, in contrast, such as Atlanta 1996, have been seen
to beneﬁt from the existing urban life around them to provide demand and from not having to wait
for planned development and/or infrastructure to arrive.
A related issue is the extent to which venues are concentrated within or dispersed around cities.
Issues have arisen in cases such as Sydney 2000 where planning has concentrated venues producing
‘sports zones’, especially when only some of the venues have been open to public use and/or when
there has been a lack of urban context.15 More dispersed Paris 1920, Mexico 1968, Los Angeles 1984,
and Athens 2004 Games were all associated with transportation issues during the Games but disper-
sal has also been seen to create the potential for a better integration of facilities within city fabrics
8Flyvbjerg et al, Megaprojects and Risks, 1-5.
9Gold and Gold, “From A to B: The Summer Olympics, 1896–2008,” 17–55.
10As in: Zimbalist, Rio 2016: Olympic Myths, Hard Realities.
11Smith, Events and Urban Regeneration, 80–83.
12Essex and Chalkley, “The Olympics as a Catalyst of Urban Renewal,” 187–206; Smith, “Spreading the Positive Eﬀects of Major Events to
Peripheral Areas,” 231–2.
13Hall, “Urban Entrepreneurship, Corporate Interests and Sports Mega-events,” 59–70; Sager, “Neo-liberal Urban Planning Policies,” 147–
99.
14For example: Liao and Pitts, “A Brief Historical Review of Olympic Urbanization,” 1232–52; Essex and Chalkley, “The Olympics as a Cat-
alyst of Urban Renewal,” 187–206.
15Müller, “The Mega-Event Syndrome,” 6–17; Smith, Events and Urban Regeneration, 75–76.
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 3
afterwards. Of course, Games plans often involve a mix of concentrated nodes of activity and disper-
sal, such as Barcelona 1992 which opted for a strategy of four ‘cluster sites’ distributed around the
city centre.16
Decisions regarding the balance between new venues to be built from scratch versus the potential
for existing venues to be refurbished clearly have a major bearing on the costs associated with the
Games but also on the levels of risk that cities take on with regard to legacy.17 Summer Games
hosts typically need to prepare 31–38 competition venues and up to 90 training sites for the 28
Olympic sports. Cities that have built large numbers of new venues have typically had higher inci-
dences of white elephants. Beijing, for example, which produced white elephants, built twenty new
venues. At the other end of the spectrum, Los Angeles built just four new venues for its 1984 Games
while reusing seventeen existing ones, and regardless of how the private ﬁnancing of this Games is
viewed, is widely seen as a model of economy. Among those refurbished, the vast Memorial Coli-
seum was a legacy of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics (and it will be used again almost a hundred
years later for the 2028 Games).18
The extent to which cities concentrate on the development of permanent or temporary venues and
how eﬀectively this decision is taken in view of realistic future demand is similarly key.19 An empha-
sis on demountable, temporary buildings has been a feature of recent Games including Beijing and
Rio, showing growing recognition of the need to reﬂect the ﬂeeting demands of venues in construc-
tion. In Salt Lake City, host to the 2002 Winter Olympics, the majority of venues were temporary,
outnumbering permanent venues by 3:1 and no white elephants were produced.20 However, in Beij-
ing and Rio, temporary buildings perhaps at best only served to take the edge oﬀ the issues of legacy
planning relating to the scale of new Olympic development.
Venue legacy is aﬀected when plans for the redevelopment of Games sites and the reuses of venues
are not in place early enough for works to proceed soon after the Games, in other words when the
timings of legacy planning and development processes have created issues. In the case of Sydney, for
example, the establishment of an urban legacy planning process and associated governance and
management arrangements has been widely seen to have begun too late, creating a lull between
the event and both the development of the main and the reuses of venues characterized by ‘uncer-
tainty’ and unconﬁdence regarding eventual outcomes.21
Coming onto the architectural design of the venues, design for reusability is clearly key to avoid-
ing white elephants and architectural obsolescence more widely, as Abramson argues.22 Reusability is
often understood as a reﬂection either of the ﬂexibility of venues – their inherent capacity to accom-
modate diﬀerent legacy reuses – or their adaptability, as in their capacity to be modiﬁed after the
Games. As Gold and Gold suggest, reusability has been an issue faced by many stadia built for ath-
letics which have rarely provided ideal conditions for other sports such as football. Much has been
written in this regard about the diﬃculties which Sydney faced in endeavouring to identify viable
reuses for the 85,000-seat Olympic Stadium (Stadium Australia) and subsequent issues of adap-
tation,23 and such diﬃculties also persist in the case of Beijing.
16Monclús, “Barcelona 1992,” 277.
17Smith, Events and Urban Regeneration, 75–76.
18Gold and Gold, From A to B, 45.
19Mangan, “Prologue: Guarantees of Global Goodwill: Post-Olympic Legacies?” 1869–83.
20Essex, The Winter Olympics, 67.
21Searle, Glen. “The Long-Term Urban Impacts of the Sydney Olympic Games,” 195–202.
22Abramson, Obsolescence, 79–106.
23Searle, “Uncertain Legacy,” 845–60; Cashman, The Bitter-sweet Awakening.
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Flexibility is shaped by a range of factors including the size and form of stadia, sightlines, the pres-
ence of covers or roofs, and relationships between stands and pitches.24 It can be facilitated through
moveable or kinetic elements such as retractable roofs, roll-out pitches and mobile stands that allow
seating to be reconﬁgured as intimated (in not successfully) realized by the Montreal Stadium of
1976. Flexibility can also be created through large, hanger-like buildings that allow for multiple
forms of future subdivision, drawing on idea of the 1960s ‘megastructure’.25 This can help ensure
that venues can cater to multiple uses encompassing elite sports as well as more every day, grass-
roots, activities.
Adaptability, in contrast, depends on the ease with which components can be removed or added. In
Atlanta, for example, themain stadium built for the 1996Olympics was designedwith removal demoli-
tion inmind to create a 47,000 seat venue for a local baseball club, the Atlanta Braves.26 However, creat-
ing adaptability after the Games is one thing, but creating long-term adaptability is another, as the
commonobsolescence of stadia after a fewdecades, even here, suggests.With careful, advance planning,
adaptability could be created to facilitate non-sporting uses if these are viable, though where the adap-
tation of venues to such uses has happened to date, it has been unplanned. For example, the 1976Mon-
treal Olympic Velodrome was adapted to create the Montreal Biodome in 1992. In Athens, numerous
venues were adapted to non-sporting uses including a large theatre, a shopping and recreation centre
and a newheadquarters for theMinistry ofHealth.27Noted issues with thesewere that the identiﬁcation
of these reuses took considerable time, and adaptation was major and costly.
Eﬀective design for reuse has often also been seen to involve the integration of future operators
and end-users in the co-design of venues.28 In Atlanta, the design of venues involved the future oper-
ators, many of whom took on the role of adapting the venues themselves afterwards.29 As Horne
argues, full public consultation before even submitting bids ‘is needed if mega-events, as megapro-
jects, are to regain public support and become more democratically accountable achievements’
rather than events that, as in Rio, require the violent repression of opposition to accomplish.30 Sig-
niﬁcant in this regard is the fact that Olympic megaevent planning is often associated with the cre-
ation of quangos and agencies set up to deliver commercial strategies but which are observed to shut
public authorities and communities out of the planning process.
Finally, coming onto ﬁnancial issues that are key to our deﬁnition of white elephants, Olympic
venues are often associated with high design and construction costs but also with high levels of
risk in terms of cost management. These are connected to the predilection of host cities and their
delivery authorities for non-standard, iconic buildings.31 This sometimes, though not always, reﬂects
neoliberal, entrepreneurial policies that emphasize the role of mega-events in the enhancement of
‘urban image’ in order to make cities more competitive in a global context. It also arises in contexts
of nation-building such as in Australia and, in diﬀerent ways, in China and post-Soviet Russia.32 As
Smith argues, iconic buildings also often reﬂect ‘political vanity’ on the part of political elites and
Games development leaders.33
24Brown and Cresciani, “Adaptable Design in Olympic Construction,” 397–416.
25Abramson, Obsolescence, 79–106.
26Gold and Gold, “From A to B,” 47; Alm et al., “Hosting Major Sports Events,” 564–82.
27Mangan, “Prologue: Guarantees of Global Goodwill: Post-Olympic Legacies?,” 1873.
28Smith, Events and Urban Regeneration, 78.
29Gold and Gold, “From A to B,” 47.
30Horne, “The Four ‘Knowns’ of Sports Mega-Events,” 92.
31Sklair, “Iconic Architecture and the Culture-Ideology of Consumerism,” 135–59.
32Traganou, Designing the Olympics, Chapters 1 and 2; Ren, “Architecture and Nation Building in the Age of Globalization,” 175–90.
33Smith, Events and Urban Regeneration, 68–70.
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Flyvbjerg and Stewart show that the costs of development for the Games have, on average, run
beyond estimates by 179 per cent in real terms since 1960.34 Overruns may have ﬁscal implications
that endure as ﬁnancial burdens for many years, as exempliﬁed by the case of Montreal, which took
forty years to pay oﬀ debts incurred through development for the 1976 Games, and by Athens where
costs overruns helped exacerbate the impacts of the 2007–12 ﬁnancial crisis.35 Developments are
often associated with high ongoing maintenance and operation costs, as illustrated by the annual
requirement of ten million dollars to maintain Beijing’s ‘Bird’s Nest’ Stadium, which is largely
unused. These costs can cause venues to limp as commercial endeavour and/or, as Alm et al evi-
dence, lead potential users to pull out of deals.36 But, as Davidson argues, they can also lead to
the adoption of commercial strategies relating to business space, housing and venue reuses that result
in exclusivity, depleting public value.37
We turn now to the case of London’s preparations for and development of the legacy to its 2012
Games to oﬀer an analysis and commentary on how it set out to avoid white elephants through plan-
ning and design from 2002. The discussion is structured to oﬀer an historical account while discuss-
ing London’s approach to each of the issues discussed above. The underpinning research involved in-
depth analysis of documents including the London Plan 2004, London’s Candidate File for the 2012
Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games (2004), planning applications for the Olympic Park and
individual venues, planning committee minutes, the annual accounts of the London Legacy Devel-
opment Corporation (LLDC) and Lea Valley Regional Park Authority (LVRPA) that own the venues
in the main Olympic site today, the legal ﬁrm Moore Stephens’ independent assessment of the
ﬁnances of the Olympic Stadium and venue operators’ management plans and websites. It also
included interviews conducted at various stages of the research including with planners at the Olym-
pic Delivery Authority (ODA) (2010), LLDC (2017), LVRPA (2009, 2019) and a local group engaged
in the design of the VeloPark (2009, 2010, 2019), and visits to the venues on several occasions.
Planning and designing out White Elephant traits – 2002–2012
From the time of London’s bid in 2002–2004 for the 2012 Olympics, decisions regarding siting and
spatial planning for the Games and legacy were formed in the context of a broader strategic plan for
the city, and this is clearly key to understanding strategies to avoid white elephants. The Greater
London Authority’s decision in 2002 to back the London bid was founded in the conviction, drawing
in particular on the experience of Barcelona, that an Olympics in East London would support its
objectives regarding regeneration and growth as set out in the ﬁrst iteration of the new London
Plan (ﬁnally published in 2004). Reﬂecting the role commonly ascribed to megaevents in the context
of neoliberal planning policy, it was believed that securing the Games would increase capacities to
mobilize public funding in infrastructural improvements and amenities and that these would create
a stimulus to market-led urban change, transforming the twenty-ﬁrst century fortunes of East
London.38 The 250-hectare site in the Lower Lea Valley chosen as a main focus for the Games
was an identiﬁed ‘Opportunity Area’ within the emerging London Plan, as a site simultaneously
awaiting regeneration and capable of accommodating substantial amounts of new development.39
34Flyvbjerg and Stewart, “Olympic Proportions,” 3.
35Panagiotopoulou, “The Legacies of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games,” 176–80.
36Alm et al., “Hosting Major Sports Events,” 564–82.
37Davidson and Mc Neill “The Redevelopment of Olympic Sites,” 1625–1641.
38London 2012, Candidate File, 1, 23
39Davis, Juliet, “Futurescapes of Urban Regeneration,” 15–16.
6 J. DAVIS
The site was seen to provide scope to address several issues associated with the locations of venues
and parklands in creating white elephants in past Olympic cities. As an historically peripheral area
that had become associated with urban decline and deprivation in the context of post-industrialis-
ation, it oﬀered the beneﬁt of being easily portrayed as needy of investment and compulsory pur-
chased for regeneration purposes. It was also large enough to accommodate a park and several
venues— an advantage often associated with more remote locations. But it was also seen to provide
beneﬁts typically associated with more central sites in being well connected via transport infrastruc-
ture and bordered by existing neighbourhoods. Among them, Stratford was to become a Metropo-
litan Centre, a focus of forty per cent of London’s anticipated job growth and a major transport
hub.40 These existing communities were seen as lacking in sports facilities among other amenities
and future communities were expected to create escalating demand.41
The East London site would provide a focus for the Games, but it would by no means accommo-
date all sporting contests. As illustrated in London’s 2004 Candidate File, the distribution of the
thirty-three Olympic sports was planned to involve a mix of concentration and dispersal. Many
events were planned to take place elsewhere in London – typically within what were identiﬁed as
the ‘River Zone’ and the ‘Central Zone’ – and even beyond, as shown in Figure 1.42
Several other key strategies to avoid white elephant are also apparent among the documents com-
prising London’s Olympic Bid. They suggest that the number of venues to be built from scratch would
be limited to twelve, while seventeen existing venues would be utilized. The Olympic Park would be
the recipient of the bulk of new construction (including eight sports venues, the Village and the
Media Press Centre/ International Media Broadcast Centre (MPC/IMPC)), though there would
also be new venues in Regent’s Park (Softball) and the Upper Lea Valley (Canoe Slalom).
Venues would be designed to be permanent only following careful future demand analysis aimed
at pre-empting the risk of functional obsolescence. This suggested the retention of only six venues –
the Velodrome, a multi-sports arena, main Olympic Stadium, Aquatics Centre and Hockey Centre in
the Olympic Park, and the Canoe Slalom facility in the Upper Lea Valley. Existing local demand for
an aquatic centre in Stratford and for a velodrome in East London was shown to be so signiﬁcant that
an intention to construct these venues irrespective of the outcome of the Bid could be conﬁrmed. The
six other new venues would be temporary. In addition, permanent venues would be designed to be
adaptable after the Games to anticipated legacy reuses – the Stadium would reduce down to a 25,000-
seat athletics venue and the Aquatics Centre would become a local swimming facility, for example.
However, despite the bold assertion within the Bid documents that the ‘extravagance’ associ-
ated with past Olympic designs and development would be curtailed,43 plans and visualizations,
produced by a consortium led by international planning and urban design ﬁrm EDAW and
including Foreign Oﬃce Architects (FOA) and Allies and Morrison Architects (A&M), suggest
no intention to pass up on the opportunity to create a spectacular Games.44 They present a vision
to transform the Lea Valley through iconicity of the kind described by Sklair as key to neoliberal
strategies of attracting global capital, and by megaevent scholars as often key to the production of
cost overruns.45
40GLA, London Plan 2004, 254; Evans, Graeme, “London 2012,” 375–77.
41GLA, op. cit. 242.
42London 2012, Candidate File, 2, 20–35.
43London, 2012, Candidate File, 1, 19; Gold and Gold, “Future Indeﬁnite?” 188.
44London 2012, op. cit., 19.
45Sklair, “Iconic Architecture and the Culture-ideology of Consumerism,”135–159.
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Following the award of the 2012 Games to London on 5th July 2005, Games leaders at the GLA
and newly established Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) set to work on commissioning three mas-
terplans covering proposals for the Games and Paralympic Games and their Legacy Transformation,
suggesting an intention to avoid the issues of timing experienced in Sydney, for example, and the
risks associated with lack of preparedness and uncertainty.46 A new Planning Decisions Team at
the ODA (which included representatives of the planning authorities from each of the Olympic
Host Boroughs) devoted to planning process associated with the Games was established in 2005.
EDAW were again appointed to lead masterplanning processes in 2006 along with FOA, Buro Hap-
pold, Allies and Morrison and HOK Sport. In spite of the conﬂicts that arose between the client and
design team (and which led, eventually, to the resignation of FOA in late 2006), Outline Planning
Approval was in place in 2007 for the suite of masterplans. Having secured this, design development
could proceed for all elements of the Olympic stage, a process involving dozens of separate planning
applications for venues, infrastructures and parklands between 2008 and 2011. Taking the form of a
new ‘Legacy Masterplan Framework’ (LMF), planning could also commence in 2008 for the longer-
term redevelopment of the site and, simultaneously, for the structure and establishment of the ‘deliv-
ery vehicle’ that this might require.47 By 2010, this ‘vehicle’ existed in the form of the Olympic Park
Legacy Company which began to drive legacy-oriented decision-making and, by 2012, the frame-
work itself had planning permission.
Broadly, the 2007 Olympic and Paralympic masterplans conﬁrmed the ﬁnal layout of elements
with the Olympic Park (Figure 2). They are, in many ways, quite diﬀerent plans to those included
in the Bid, though principles regarding the general mix of temporary and permanent venues, and
ideas of adaptability remained in place, as shown in Figure 2. The Legacy Transformation master-
plan showed how the event stage would be transformed through the removal of temporary venues
and operations areas, the reconnection or ‘stitching’ of the site to surrounding neighbourhoods, and
adaptation of parklands to create a series of ‘development platforms’ (Figure 3).48
The goal of the LMF (renamed and approved as the Legacy Communities Scheme (LCS) in 2010)
was to show how the redevelopment of these platforms could, over a period extending from 2012–
2031, produce what was described as a ‘new piece of city’49 arising from the ‘inheritance’ of the
Figure 1 Olympic sites and locations [Juliet Davis, 2018]
46National Audit Oﬃce, Preparations for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 7–22.
47As described by LDA planners in interviews, 2007–2009.
48ODA PDT, Olympic, Paralympic & Legacy Transformation Planning Applications, 12.
49Burdett, The London Olympics – Making a “Piece of City”.
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Figure 2 Diagram based on the Olympic Masterplan of 2007 showing locations of temporary and permanent
venues within the Olympic Park [Juliet Davis, 2018]
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Figure 3 Diagram based on the Olympic Legacy Phase Masterplan of 2007 showing permanent venues and devel-
opment sites (marked with dashed lines) [Juliet Davis, 2018]
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Olympic Park.50 It was a strategy to avoid the lack of vitality associated with monofunctional sports
zones and, instead, enhance the beneﬁts already created by the location of the site by generating
further demand for the venues as future amenities. In developing this urban legacy, the LMF mas-
terplanners – a consortium including, yet again, EDAW and Allies & Morrison and also Dutch Kees
Christiaanse Architects and Planners (KCAP) – drew from historical precedents such as Verona in
Italy where iconic vestiges of the Roman city, akin to the Olympic venues, are embedded within a
ﬁne-grained urban fabric that developed over time. Though proposals for urban form evolved, at
the inception of the LMF, a compact, mixed-use and walkable city fabric was envisioned, exemplify-
ing the Labour government’s (1997-2010) Urban Renaissance agenda.
As suggested by the planning applications drawings submitted by the venue architects between
2008 and 2012, temporary venues were designed to be able to make valuable contributions to the fes-
tival-ground image of the Park during the Games but also to be dismantled and easily removed after-
wards. Designs for the 12,000-seat Basketball Arena by Wilkinson Eyre Architects, for example,
demonstrated through its folded façade surfaces that ﬂeeting buildings could be as dramatic visually
as permanent venues. Strategies used to make the building demountable included supporting it on
hardstanding rather than slab foundations and using standard component sizes and simple connec-
tion details. In accordance with the ODA’s sustainability strategy, designs were also expected to
maximize capacities for materials to be recycled or reused afterwards, hence managing the potential
wastefulness of planned obsolescence associated with temporary architecture.
Designs for the ﬁve permanent venues showed already in 2008 how they could be adapted after
the Games to suit anticipated legacy reuses. In the case of the Aquatics Centre, by Zaha Hadid
Architects, adaptability was created by designing the 17,500 spectator seats needed during the
Games as two removable ‘water wings’ on the sides of the building. The temporary water polo
facility adjacent to the building would also be removed. In contrast, for the Handball Arena by
MAKE Architects – now called the Copper Box Arena – the key move was to create a permanent
carapace that could be wrapped in the facilities needed to service it during the Games and ﬁtted
out to suit the needs of Olympic contests, and then unwrapped, gutted and reﬁtted internally to
produce a long-term, multi-use venue. The shell of the Velodrome, designed by Hopkins Archi-
tects, would also change relatively little though the landscape around the building would be remo-
delled to create an extensive VeloPark. The Olympic Stadium by Populous/ HOK Sport and Eton
Manor by Stanton Williams Architects would both, in contrast, transform substantially, reﬂecting
concerns regarding the future viability of both venues. Drawings of the Stadium from 2008 indi-
cate a largely temporary structure, a far more pragmatic aﬀair than Herzog and de Meuron’s
megalomanic ‘birds’ nest’ Stadium in Beijing, destined for deconstruction to provide a much
more modest building as a home for British athletics.51 The transformation of Eton Manor
would involve a complex set of removals, insertions and new construction to form a Hockey
and Tennis Centre. As with the temporary venues, the designs of permanent venues were expected
to show how waste would be minimized in the process of adaptation and the removal of tempor-
ary components. One clear challenge of this would be that adaptations as envisioned were major
(and, hence, costly) works.
In order to address the problem of a lack of involvement of future operators and users in designs in
past Games, the ODA, and, from 2010, the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC), endeavoured to
secure future venue operators during the design phase, before the Games, in a bid to develop a
50Evans, Graeme, “London 2012,” 382.
51Brown and Cresciani, “Adaptable Design in Olympic Construction,” 397–416.
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credible future reuse strategy. The Lea Valley Regional Park Authority (LVRPA) which manages
public open land extending northward from the site was part of the process of making a case for
the Games from 2002 as it already had plans for a Velodrome that predated this.52 It was established
as future operator of the Velopark and Eton Manor in 2005. Later, the ODA also engaged members
of a local group known as the Eastway Users Group (EUG) who had utilized a cycling facility located
on the same site before the Olympics.53 However, as reported by the leader of the group in interview,
this only came about after it had succeeded in publicising a claim to have been ‘evicted from the site
in 2006’ and not recognized as a stakeholder in its future.54 In other words, engagement here rep-
resented an attempt to resolve issues of democracy and inclusion that have often been associated
with megaevents, as with planning processes led by quangos.55
For the Aquatics Centre and the Copper Box Arena, a not-for-proﬁt social enterprise called
Greenwich Leisure Limited was brought on board as future operator in 2011 under a ten-year
arrangement, allowing it to play the lead role in the development of venue management plans
and to shape design in its ﬁnal stages before Transformation works began in 2012. The process of
securing an operator for the Olympic Stadium unfolded less smoothly, however. The market
response to an athletics venue was lower than expected, yet interest began to be shown in 2009
by football clubs including West Ham United. There was also a revealing reluctance on the part
of the Conservative Mayor Boris Johnson whose term in oﬃce began in 2008, as the planning appli-
cation for the venue was being ﬁnalised, to forsake the capacity of the Stadium to host major events.56
This reﬂected Johnson’s predilection for monumentality and, as a reported by one planner at the
LLDC, a conviction that ‘we can’t lose the Stadium’, in spite of warnings and lessons from other cities
such as Sydney regarding large stadia.57
This led to a revisiting of ideas regarding permanent and temporary aspects of the Stadium’s archi-
tecture, in eﬀect undoing years of work on avoiding a stadium white elephant through adaptability.
In 2010, the newly established OPLC, launched a competition for a leaseholder/operator. It was won
by a public-private partnership comprising the London Borough of Newham andWest Ham United.
The result was challenged by unsuccessful bidders and, fearing damaging publicity, in late 2011, the
OPLC aborted the deal.58 A new competition was launched in December 2011. Under pressure of
time, plans to convert the Stadium into ‘a 60,000-seat multi-purpose venue with the capability of
hosting top class athletics and football’ but also ‘a wide range of sporting, cultural and community
events’ were developed by Populous during early 2012 and submitted for planning permission on 1
August 201259 before the competition outcomes had even been ascertained, let alone an operator
brought on board. There were knock-on impacts on the LMF and on the timings of planning
approval, which toiled on into the summer of 2013.
One of the goals of advance planning was to enable the costs of the Games and Legacy Transform-
ation to be anticipated accurately, in theory enabling risk and uncertainty regarding post-Olympic
costs to be managed. London’s 2004 Candidate File conﬁrmed a budget of £1.54 billion for
OCOG operational costs and £2.67 billion for non-OCOG direct costs associated with construction
for the Games. On 15 March 2007, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport announced
52Interview, LVRPA representative, 2009.
53Hopkins Architects, London 2012 Velodrome, 23.
54Interview, EUG, October 2009.
55Sager, “Neo-liberal Urban Planning Policies”; Davidson and McNeill, “The Redevelopment of Olympic Sites,” 1625–1628.
56Stewart and Rayner, “Planning Mega-event Legacies,” 171.
57Interview, LLDC senior planner, November 2017.
58Stephens, “Moore Stephens Olympic Stadium Review,” 8.
59Planning reference: 12/00066/FUM
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that the budget for these combined elements had increased to £9.325 billion (the projected ﬁnal cost).
According to Flyvbjerg and Stewart, by 2012, the total OCOG and non-OCOG-related sports cost
represented a ‘cost overrun of 101 per cent as compared to the budget in the Bid’.60 The budget
for sports venues alone (including non-Olympic Park ones) in 2007 was £1.038 billion, considerably
more than the £885 million in the Bid and this had risen to 1.051 billion by 2012 (excluding Trans-
formation work).61 Some venues were more costly than others. Notably, costs associated with the
Aquatics Centre trebled between 2004 and 2012 to £269 million – an unprecedent ﬁgure for a pub-
licly-funded swimming complex in the UK. By comparison, the equivalently sized Cardiﬀ Inter-
national Pool opened in 2008 was constructed for approximately one tenth of the price (£32
million). These ﬁgures reveal London as another case of high ambition combined with overly opti-
mistic economic modeling at the start of the process and a high cost burden for the public purse later
- an exemplar of Flyvbjerg et al.’s ‘megaproject paradox,’ as described above.
Reuse strategies for the permanent venues were not anticipated to create the means to directly
recover these costs. However, the sustainable reuses of the venues were expected to have a positive
impact on the economic value of property within the ‘development platforms’. In turn, capital
appreciation combined with development rentals or sales in the future were anticipated to provide
the means for a portion of the public funding package needed to host the Games site to be recov-
ered,62 though this could take decades and involve considerable further public investment along
the way. This highlights the close relationship between ﬁnancial and spatial planning in the devel-
opment of the London Olympics’ urban legacy and draws attention to the potential for strategy
geared toward the creation of economic value to be in tension with regeneration goals geared toward
the production of beneﬁts for local areas and people.
In turn, future usage of the venues was expected to provide means to cover the maintenance and
operation costs associated with venues and parklands, though an London Assembly report from
2011 indicates that venues would most likely not be able to be fully self-ﬁnancing.63 According to
an LLDC investment committee report from 2018, the Aquatics Centre was expected at this stage
to be the most expensive, generating a deﬁcit of up to £835,000 per annum.
We turn now to explore the signiﬁcance of eﬀorts to avoid white elephants before the Games for
the processes of Legacy Transformation and reuse afterwards and to consider the eﬀectiveness of
these in relation to the key aspects of the deﬁnition of white elephants presented in the introduction.
Legacy transformation – August 2012–2018
Because the organization of the timings of planning and design for legacy had succeeded in ensuring
that much of the work necessary to commence the Legacy Transformation works was in place before
the Games, little uncertainty regarding what these would entail remained in relation to the Aquatics
Centre, Copper Box Arena, VeloPark, and Eton Manor Hockey and Tennis Centre after them. Plan-
ning activity after August 2012 typically involved the approval of details or construction methods
related to conditions in earlier planning permissions, the approval of non-material amendments
and minor changes or additions arising in the process of ﬁnalising proposals for operating the legacy
venues, and the submission by operators GLL and LVRPA of Event Management Plans and
60Flyvbjerg and Stewart, “Olympic Proportions,” 15.
61DCMS, London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Quarterly Report, 10.
62Grant-Long, “The Olympic Games and Urban Development Impacts,” 101–13.
63London Assembly, Park Life, 12.
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Validation Reports as required under the ODA’s conditions to reopen venues. Transformation of
these venues, and of the wider Park indeed, was able to proceed from Autumn 2012.
The fact that governance arrangements regarding the Legacy Transformation works and the
realization of the long-term urban legacy (described by the legacy masterplan framework/ LCS)
were well-established was of course key to this. The former works had fallen under the remit of
the ODA but were taken up by the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) which super-
seded the earlier OPLC (as above). Upon its formation in 2012, the LLDC took on the ownership of
the site, absorbed the planning powers held by the ODA before 2012 and, under the new British Loc-
alism Act (2011), was enabled to create local planning policy for the site and its urban fringe, thereby
becoming responsible for delivering the latter as well. Its challenge would be to balance objectives
regarding the regeneration of East London with the need of a commercial landowner focused on rea-
lizing the economic potential of the Olympic ‘catalyst’.
A careful sequencing and timing of activities continued to form an important part of the OPLC/
LLDC/s plan for delivering the Legacy Transformation works from 2012, simply deﬁned as their
‘Clear, Connect and Complete’ strategy.64 ‘Clear’ involved the removal of vast quantities of material
associated with temporary venues, Games-time security, spectator stands, hard landscaping, catering
facilities, back-of house operations associated with all venues (as shown in Figure 2), and all other
items of event ‘overlay’ as installed by the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paral-
ympic Games (LOCOG), creating the ‘developments platforms’ discussed above. ‘Connect’ entailed
the creation of strategic ‘stitches’ (bridges, footways and cycle paths) between the site and surround-
ing areas, opening facilities and infrastructures up to these neighbourhoods.65 ‘Complete’, ﬁnally,
involved the planned works necessary to adapt parklands and permanent venues ready for
reopening.
As discussed in the section above, the sustainability strategy developed by the ODA required the
designers of temporary venues and other elements to consider how to minimize the potential waste
that removal – the focus of the ‘Clear’ work – would generate. The upshot was that 90 per cent of
material (and sports equipment) was either reused or recycled, suggesting that the objective of the
strategy was met.66 Notwithstanding, the early vision that whole venues might be reinstalled else-
where did not materialize. For example, Wilkinson Eyre’s Basketball Arena which, for a time, was
considered as a potential venue for Rio 2016, was dismantled and sold oﬀ as components as costs
of transportation and re-erection became prohibitive. The signiﬁcance of this is that recycling is
more energy-intensive yet less economical than reuse and that London’s temporary installations
were more impactful in terms of carbon and cost than they might have been, and that they were
also more wasteful of value invested in high-end design.
For four of the permanent venues – the Aquatics Centre, Copper Box Arena, Velodrome and Eton
Manor (from here on the Lee Valley Hockey and Tennis Centre) – the ‘Complete’ works were
broadly as outlined in the previous section, including the removal of the ‘water wings’ on the
Aquatics Centre (Figure 4), the formation of the VeloPark, and the like. The design of the venues
had of course been ﬁne-tuned continuously since 2008 to suit the emerging programmes of antici-
pated reusage in each case. A common emphasis had been placed on creating the potential for every-
day as well as event use, and for grassroots as well as elite sporting activities. For example, planned
adaptations of the Velodrome to form cycling tracks designed around the requirements of the four
64OPLC, Creating the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, 23.
65Ibid.
66WRAP, “London 2012 Legacy Transfer Report,”
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cycling disciplines, a VeloStudio, conferencing facilities and cycle hire facility, reﬂected the LVRPA’s
desire to appeal to diﬀerent cyclists and provide for ‘all levels of cycling, from entry-level to inter-
national standard’ (Figure 5).1 The works proceeded rapidly, and these four venues reopened to
Figure 4 Aquatics Centre viewed from across the QE Olympic Park, with new development in the background
[Juliet Davis, 2018]
Figure 5 The Velodrome viewed from across part of the VeloPark [Juliet Davis,2018]
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the public between mid-2013 and early 2014. Northern and southern sections of the renamed Queen
Elizabeth Olympic Park also opened between these dates.
However, the slower process of securing a future for the Stadium before the Games meant that
negotiations with prospective operators and transformation planning remained ongoing throughout
this time. There were also ongoing uncertainties surrounding viability, governance, future operation,
and the design brief for adaptation. In terms of governance, E20 Stadium LLP was established in
2012 as a partnership between the then newly established LLDC and the London Borough of New-
ham under a 102-year lease arrangement. Following the complex bidding process described in the
previous section, West Ham United was again selected as preferred bidder in December 2012.
As reported in legal ﬁrm Moore Stephen’s analysis of the Stadium’s troubled history, one of the
conditions it exacted from the LLDC was that ‘retractable seating [would] be installed to cover the
[remaining] athletics tracks during football matches and that all seats [would] be covered by a roof’
in order to create appropriate relationships between spectators and players in the context of football
matches while retaining the capacity for the venue to be a focus for British athletics.67 Again keen to
minimize further delays, the LLDC took the risk of allowing these works to begin in 2014 before
design had been completed. As it turned out, the seating did not work leading the contractor to
go into administration and creating the need for redesign. The resulting delays came at a cost to
the project and a decision to proceed with hosting the 2015 Rugby World Cup meant splitting
the works into two phases, creating further delays and costs. The works were ﬁnally complete in
the summer of 2016.
Coming onto matters of practical value, the evidence of visitor numbers to the four other venues
suggests that they have been in high demand since opening in 2013/2014 and are a far cry from func-
tional obsolescence. In 2017, more than one million people visited the London Aquatics Centre while
425,773 visited the Copper Box Arena.68 According to one manager interviewed as part of the
research, approximately 850,000 visited the VeloPark and 600,000 attended the Lee Valley Hockey
and Tennis Centre.69 Of course, these ﬁgures are silent regarding who the venues hold value for or
who is able to use them, the balance of local users from the Olympic Host Boroughs versus other
visitors, the extent to which local demands for the new facilities have been met or the relationship
between visitor numbers and venues capacities. Dense programmes of events, extended opening
times and the range of facilities on oﬀer at each venue certainly suggest a common intention to
encourage the participation of diverse user groups and to maximize the use of venues. However,
the following oﬀers some more detailed observations on the mix of users and uses at two of the
four – the Aquatics Centre and the VeloPark.
The Aquatics Centre has hosted numerus swimming events including, among many others, the
Invictus Games and the LEN European Aquatics Championships while being very much a public
pool, open all week. A range of lessons, courses and other opportunities for swimmers of diﬀerent
levels are available, bookable by individuals, schools or other organizations. As reported by the
LLDC, in 2017/18, ‘3,000 school children attend[ed] weekly lessons and 3,800 young people signed
up to the Better Swim School programme and 700 to the learn to dive programme’70 One issue is
that, due to the venue’s location in an area of high population growth, adjacent to a large new shop-
ping centre and well-served by public transport, local demand is anticipated to increase. However,
local demand is not the only kind of demand for the venues. Demand from visitors from beyond
67Moore Stephens, Moore Stephens Olympic Stadium Review, 9.
68LLDC, Annual Report and Accounts 2017/2018.
69Interview, Vibrant Partnerships, manager, May 2019.
70Ibid, 11.
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the London Borough of Newham wishing to experience the iconic facility is also high and anticipated
to remain so. There is a recognized risk that local demand will increasingly not be met by the venue,
especially at peak use times.71 This is a very diﬀerent problem to the lack of practical value that is
intrinsic to the deﬁnition of white elephants of course but it is an important one in light of the prom-
ised of beneﬁts arising from the Games for a deprived East London lacking in amenities, for the idea
of local legacy.
Past Velodromes such as the one built for the 2004 Athens Olympics designed by Santiago Cala-
trava, the Spanish designer famed for producing white elephants, have proved particularly vulnerable
to obsolescence. The VeloPark has, in contrast, been used for an array of international, national,
regional and local competitive events, as a training venue for national and regional-level clubs
and a local cycle centre. The venue has oﬀered a packed programme of cycling opportunities
aimed at widening participation in the sport to better include women, BME groups, and disabled
people as well as to cultivate interest and nurture emerging talent among junior riders. One issue
here is with the location of the venue which though only a mile away from the Aquatics Centre,
and a little further away from public transport links makes it ‘more of a hard sell’, as one manager
put it, underscoring the crucial importance of accessibility.72 Another appears to be with how diﬀer-
ent demands are met in order to cover those marketing and operation costs. The LVRPA’s strapline
is ‘commercially oriented, community led’. Members the Eastway Users’ Group (EUG) which was
heavily involved in the design of the venue before the Games (as discussed in the section above)
argued that, in responding to interest in hosting events, the LVRPA has typically favoured some
groups over others, notably commercial operators over volunteer-run clubs. ‘The community
element’, as the former group leader put it, ‘is marginalised’ and the result is that certain grassroots
sporting events that could happen at the VeloPark have gone elsewhere.73 As with the Aquatics
Centre, this is clearly signiﬁcant in light of the construction of early justiﬁcations for Olympic
Games-related development, and, particularly, for the redevelopment of an existing cycling facility
in terms of regeneration and local demand.
The fate of the Stadium was, at least until 2016, a diﬀerent matter altogether. It began to be utilized
by West Ham in August 2016. Since then, it has played host to the Athletics World Cup, the Muller
Anniversary Games and three seasons of West Ham United Football Club’s games. These events
suggest the potential for the use-value of this building to turn around and, thus, perhaps, for it to
be no longer a white elephant. However, there have been teething issues associated with the designed
ﬂexibility of the building – for example, 28 days per annum of potential use are lost to seat moves,
and pitch speciﬁcations limit use for some sports such as cricket.74
This brings us on, ﬁnally, to the issue of the legacies of planning and design to date in terms of: (a)
costs of Legacy Transformation, and (b) costs of operation and maintenance relative to income.
Work undertaken in 2012–13 was reported to have been carried out for £89 million reﬂecting the
signiﬁcant amount of construction necessary to adapt venues and parklands.75 This was, however,
within the 2007 public funding budget allocated to Transformation and left £375 million to spend
on the completions of the IMBC/MPC, Main Stadium and landscaping.76 But, by the opening of
the Stadium in 2016, transformation costs had spiralled to a vast £323 million for it alone. Under
714 global Consulting, London Borough of Newham, Strategic Leisure Facility Needs Assessment, 101–16.
72Interview, Vibrant Partnerships, manager, May 2019.
73Structured interviews conducted with EUG in May 2019.
74“Moore Stephens, Olympic Stadium Review, 159.
75LLDC, Annual Report and Accounts 2012–2013.
76Ibid.
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the terms of the deal struck with E20 Stadium LLP, West Ham itself invested only £15 million
upfront though was committed to paying rent over the 100-year period of its lease. In theory, this
would enable investment to be recouped incrementally but, in the meantime, at a time of austerity
aﬀecting the provision and operation of public facilities across the UK, the public purse was made to
bear the immediate cost and long-term risk for uncertain public beneﬁt. In 2016, the overrun led the
new Mayor Sadiq Khan to request the GLA to commission an investigation into the Stadium’s
ﬁnances and to bring E20 Stadium LLP under Mayoral control, suggesting the potential for new
beginnings. However, as a result of uncertain futurity and the fact that net expenditure on the
venue for 2017–2018 alone totalled £14.9 million, the Stadium remains only a liability, a white ele-
phant in ﬁnancial terms, its ‘fair value’ as a public asset standing at zero.77
Cost associated with maintaining and operating all the venues have also been considerable. Since
their opening, GLL has shouldered operation costs associated with the Aquatics Centre and Copper
Box Arena, though maintenance costs are covered by LLDC. GLL receive the revenue but pay a fee to
the LLDC, and surpluses or deﬁcits are shared between the two. Though the LLDC’s Annual Report
and Accounts of 2017/2018 suggest ‘strong revenue performance’ for their facilities generally, they
also reveal that the Aquatics Centre was operated at a deﬁcit to the LLDC of an eye-watering £1.255
million (signiﬁcantly higher than anticipated) while, for the ﬁrst time, the Copper Box Arena oper-
ated at a small surplus of £91,000.78 In other words, despite meeting projected visitor number targets,
providing societal beneﬁts and addressing demands, the Aquatics Centre is ‘limping’ by comparison
to forecasts. The issue here is not that the venue operates at a cost to the public purse, as public pools
in the UK typically do, but how much it costs and that moves to bring costs in line with other such
amenities could pose risks to the accessibility and inclusivity of the facility in the future, already
suggested by recent price rises.
Since opening, the venues owned by the LVRPA have been leased and operated by a Trust called
Vibrant Partnerships. The LVRPA is funded by a mixture of private incomes and a levy on the
London Boroughs. Though precise ﬁgures for the costs of the venues were not identiﬁed through
this research, LVRPA annual accounts from 2017 report that ‘ﬁnancial liabilities relating to the
Olympic venues were signiﬁcant’. Further, as relayed by one manager, the VeloPark runs at a
‘small operational surplus’ while the Hockey and Tennis Centre runs ‘at a reasonable deﬁcit’. How-
ever, as he put it, ‘we have to work a heck of a lot to break even’ on the VeloPark.79 As with Aquatics,
and as already indicated, the risk this poses relate to the ‘community-oriented’ aspect of the LVRPA’s
management strategy.
Of course, the redevelopment of the Park remains key to the ﬁnancial health of the Olympic Park
venues overall. Planning gain from the award of permissions related to the ‘development platforms’,
the sale of developments and a Fixed Estate Charge levied on the new residents of the Park all pro-
vide the means for the LLDC to oﬀset costs of investment, management and maintenance. While
these sources of revenue can be seen as part of a distinctive urbanistic model that London has created
with regard to legacy-making, there remains the possibility that decisions regarding investments in
regeneration goals elsewhere in the LLDC’s area could be aﬀected by ﬁnancial issues associated with
parklands and venues. This is reﬂected not least in LLDC Chair Peter Hendy’s 2018 statement that
‘[s]signiﬁcant challenges remain for delivering […] homes and jobs and putting all the venues,
especially the London Stadium, onto a sustainable footing’.80
77LLDC, Annual Report and Accounts 2017/2018, 70–71.
78Ibid., 83.
79Interview, Vibrant Partnerships, manager, May 2019.
80LLDC, “Annual Report and Accounts 2017/2018,” 3.
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Conclusions
Anticipating the legacy of London’s 2012 Games began, as has often been seen to be the case in the
early stages of megaevent bidding and planning, with the articulation of major promises. Among
these was a pledge to avoid the white elephants that have plagued other Olympic cities. The
paper has explored how London addressed this promise through the planning and design of its
venues and what the outcomes have been over a six-year period.
Planning and design strategies developed before 2012 addressed many of the issues arising in the
context of earlier Olympic Games, as documented in the ﬁrst part of the paper, relating to the siting
of venues in view of understandings of existing and future demand for sports facilities, the use of
existing venues for the Games, the timings of legacy planning, the challenge of repurposing perma-
nent development, the creation of appropriate adaptability and ﬂexibility, the demountability and
recyclability of temporary venues, and the early involvement of future operators and users. However,
the processes of planning, design and development also produced a major cost overrun, a character-
istic outcome of megaprojects, that raises important questions regarding value for money for the
public purse and the local communities that would host the Games. Tensions between the commer-
cial orientation of legacy development positioned as the means to recoup investment and the
promise of regeneration in deprived East London also began to be apparent at this stage. These
are understood as perennial issues of neoliberalism involving the use of megaevent design and devel-
opment as ‘catalysts’ to property-led transformation. By 2012, the Stadium seemed set to become
another exemplar of the white elephant phenomenon – a hulking structure with uncertain practical
value.
Since the Games, the beneﬁts of planning timed to avoid an ‘uncertain legacy’ as in Sydney were
evident in the eﬃciency with which much of the Legacy Transformation work proceeded, leading to
the repurposing of four venues by 2014. The Stadium, conversely, suﬀered as a result of the change in
approach to its future before 2012 and produced a further ‘calamitous cost overrun’81 in the process
of transformation, all the more signiﬁcant as this occurred at a time of constrained public ﬁnances
nationally. This venue reﬂects many of the issues associated with neoliberal planning policy invol-
ving the production of expensive iconic buildings, top-down decision-making by political elites,
and the taking of risk at public expense. But the challenge of creating venues that pay their way
and are, at the same time, widely accessible is apparent across the other venues, creating long-
term uncertainty regarding their operability, inclusivity and the delivery of regeneration goals across
the park more widely. As all the venues are ‘expensive to keep’, to quote the OED in its deﬁnition of a
white elephant, legacy leaders must continue to demonstrate their social and cultural values, and
how, thus, costs can continue to be substantiated.
The case oﬀers several contributions to existing understandings of how to avoid white elephants.
It strengthens existing arguments regarding the importance of developing strategies related to the
locations and futures of venues in the context of wider urban plans. It suggests the need to go beyond
strategies to increase the number of temporary venues to also seek to reduce the costs and potential
waste associated with dismantling structures. While highlighting the value of designing permanent
venues to be adaptable and ﬂexible, it also points to the need to manage the cost of the work this
entails which can also be burdensome and raise questions regarding the real value of the Olympics
as a means to deliver amenities for localities and cities. While the programmes of activity associated
with the Aquatics Centre and VeloPark oﬀer new precedents for current and future Olympics cities,
81Flyvbjerg et al., Megaprojects and Risks, 11–22.
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they also suggest that careful consideration of how diﬀerent demands for facilities are balanced is
required to avoid social exclusions. Cost overruns in the context of development and transformation
point to an ongoing need for responsible realism at the inception of processes and a better antici-
pation of risks. But ﬁnally, while London oﬀers an exemplar in many ways of an Olympic Games
that has been integrated within a long-term plan for the creation of a strategically-positioned new
‘piece of city’, issues of inclusion, value and risk highlighted throughout the paper also point to
the value of going beyond mere tweaks to the status quo – creating less elephantine megaevent stages
– to consider fundamentally alternative rationales for and approaches to Olympic Games planning
and design.
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